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In Putin’s Shadow
Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency
Key points
1. Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency was an experiment carried out by the
Russian ruling elite. Medvedev, a member of that ruling elite, was ‘anoint-
ed’ to the highest state office, while the real power was supposed to re -
main in the hands of Vladimir Putin, who left the Kremlin and was appoint -
ed as Prime Minister, a post formally subordinate to the president. Even
though the new president has been a loyal member of the ruling camp,
this decision involved certain risk: his extensive constitutional powers
could eventually encourage him to seek emancipation, which could have
provoked internal conflicts and splits in the elite. However, the develop-
ments of Medvedev's presidency show that the ruling elite can consider
the ‘succession experiment’ successful: it has brought the elite many be -
nefits, especially in the economic sphere, while not resulting in any seri-
ous internal conflicts which would have undermined its position.
2. Throughout his presidency Medvedev acted as a loyal representative
of Putin's elite. This was because Medvedev failed to overcome the re -
strictions imposed on him by the ruling elite at the start of his presiden -
tial term: he was unable to conduct an independent staffing policy, or gain
access to the decision-making process concerning the economy (espe-
cially the distribution of assets). His rhetoric, which was often critical of
the system of government formed by Putin, was not backed up by action,
and the actions he took in fact reinforced this system. Also, Medvedev's
modernisation rhetoric and his demonstrated openness to cooperation
with the West conformed to the interests of the Russian government, and
were meant to attract foreign investments and new technologies to Russia,
which was facing an economic crisis and declining resource production.
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3. A formal ‘split’ in the elite, along with President Medvedev’s pro-mo-
dernisation image, became the catalyst to activate those groups in Rus sian
society which had benefited from the economic growth, but felt that
opportunities for further development were limited. These groups, which
can be conventionally termed the middle class, began to call for a new so-
cial contract with the government. This new contract was supposed to ci -
vilise the relationship between the state and the society: reduce bureau -
cratic barriers and systemic corruption, and curb the arbitrariness of
state bodies. However, President Medvedev failed to become a genuine
ally to these groups. His real powers were limited, and more importantly,
the interests of the aforementioned groups and of Putin’s ruling elite (to
which Medvedev has belonged) are at serious variance.
4. Despite Medvedev's loyal attitude towards the ruling elite, his presi-
dency was limited to only one term, and the elite's leader Vladimir Putin
has decided to return to the Kremlin. His return has not met with any se -
rious resistance either in Russia or abroad: he remains Russia’s most po -
pular politician, and international partners, including foreign investors,
regard him as the leader who will guarantee internal stability. Upon his
return, Putin assumed the image of a strong, yet modern and moderni-
sation-oriented political leader. After his inevitable victory in the presi-
dential elections, he is likely to carry out limited economic reforms, as
he did at the beginning of his first presidency in 2000. However, no sys-
temic reforms, including political changes, should be expected; this will
reduce the chances for any economic reforms to succeed, and will fur-
ther impair Russia’s competitiveness. The lack of systemic reforms may
fuel intellectual ferment in the expanding middle class, whose activation
may be regarded as the most tangible legacy of Dmitry Medvedev’s presi -
dency. A strict domestic policy may also increase the risk that certain
hard-line nationalist groups, which act outside the official circuit and are
clearly gaining momentum, will gain in strength.
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Introduction
In March 2008, Dmitry Medvedev was elected president, and his prede-
cessor Vladimir Putin took the post of Prime Minister. Putin’s departure
from the Kremlin can be deemed an exceptional experiment in Russia’s
recent history: the most influential politician and the leader of the rul-
ing elite, who was at the peak of his popularity, chose to leave the most
important state position, thus complying with the constitutional require -
ment (the number of presidential terms is limited to two in a row1). The
Russian ruling elite2 thus chose not to change the constitution to prolong
Putin’s term of office, and instead devised a succession scenario under
which the president’s office was taken by Dmitry Medvedev, a close asso-
ciate of Putin and a loyal member of the ruling elite. A new governance
formula emerged in Russia – the ruling ‘tandem’, combined of Medvedev,
who assumed the most important state office, and Putin who retained
the greatest (albeit largely informal) influence in the ruling elite, Russian
politics and the economy.
This paper examines the developments and results of the succession of
power in the Kremlin. The question it aims to answer is whether the per-
sonal change in Russia’s principal office of state has changed the system
of government and the ruling elite’s composition and policies. The paper
analyses the criteria and objectives under which Medvedev was chosen
7
1 Article 81, paragraph 3. This also means that a politician who had held the office for
two terms (as Vladimir Putin has done) can legally return to the Kremlin after a break.
2 The term ‘ruling elite’ is used in the text to describe a group of Vladimir Putin’s close
associates from the state administration, business and the institutions of force, who
have major leverage on state policies. The structure of the elite is far from formal, and
some of its members do not hold any public offices. Most of the elite’s members were
Putin’s close associates from when he worked in the KGB (1975-1990) and in the St
Petersburg mayor’s office (1990-1996). Putin formed this elite during his presidency
(2000-2008), and it is he who has retained the informal position of the arbiter and guar-
antor of the balance within the elite. For details, see Jadwiga Rogo˝a, The power gained,
we will never surrender. The Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic cri-
sis. OSW Policy Briefs 19, 15 October 2009, www.osw.waw.pl.
to be president, his policies (especially their compliance with the interests
of the elite which had ‘anointed’ him), and tries to outline the bound-
aries of President Medvedev’s autonomy. The text also presents the atti-
tude of politically active groups in Russian society towards his presidency.
Finally, in the light of Putin’s plans to return to the Kremlin, the paper
concludes with the possible consequences thereof, and a reflection on
the sustainability of the processes initiated during Dmitry Medvedev’s
presidency.
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I. The succession operation of 2008: 
why Medvedev? 
Dmitry Medvedev's presidency – as intended by its originators, the ruling
elite led by Vladimir Putin – had three main objectives. Firstly, the
change of president, as required by the constitution, was supposed to help
maintain the ruling elite's democratic legitimacy. The second, crucial goal
was to preserve the personal composition and economic influence of Pu -
tin’s elite, for which the political system formed during Putin’s presiden cy
needed to be maintained. Thirdly, Medvedev's presidency (which coincid -
ed with the global economic crisis) was supposed to improve Russia’s
international image and demonstrate that it is a modern state, deter-
mined to modernise, open to cooperation and attractive to investors.
Medvedev's election as president was not a democratic process entailing
political competition, but rather a behind-the-scenes decision taken by
the elite which ‘anointed’ a loyal member from within itself to the presi -
dency, and ensured public support for this decision. When choosing their
candidate for president, the members of the elite were guided mostly by
the contenders’ personal characteristics. In the case of Medvedev, his ad -
vantages were his long-time relationship with Putin (since the early
1990s, Medvedev has repeatedly demonstrated his loyalty to Putin dur-
ing their acquaintance), as well as his lack of clear leadership aspirations
and attempts to play a leading role (Medvedev usually acted as a trusted
executor of the tasks Putin set). Moreover, media publications indicate
that the elite may possess information compromising Medvedev (possi-
bly related to his activities in the 1990s3). This could have been another
instrument of control over the president, as the risk of his emancipation
9
3 In the 1990s, Medvedev was a lawyer in the St Petersburg mayor’s office, in the Com -
mittee for External Relations headed by Vladimir Putin. The Committee was repeatedly
accused of concluding controversial foreign contracts. For details, see Jadwiga Rogo˝a,
The power gained, we will never surrender. The Russian ruling elite versus the succession
and economic crisis., op.cit., p. 9.
and a consequent split in the elite was regarded as one of the main chal-
lenges to the succession project.
Despite a decisive victory in the first round of elections (70.3% of votes),
the new president had in fact very limited political autonomy. To become
president, Medvedev had to accept a number of informal arrangements
and restrictions fettering him in his further actions and decisions, as well
as an extensive system of (often unofficial) supervision over his actions.
Vladimir Putin placed Medvedev into a tightly controlled frame work by
staffing the presidential institutions and ‘appointing’ Medvedev’s en -
tourage, among other measures. Before the elections, Medvedev – as the
candidate for president – had been ‘assigned’ a liberal support base that
accompanied him throughout the campaign and election4. Among the
politicians who found themselves in Medvedev’s ‘pool’ were Alexander
Voloshin, a former head of the Presidential Admi ni stration, Leonid Reyman,
minister of communications and a founder of the INSOR think tank, and
the billionaire businessman Roman Abra mo vich. Following the elections,
Vladimir Putin staffed presidential institutions with his trusted asso -
ciates, who were not closely connected with Medvedev. Sergei Naryshkin
was appointed head of the Presidential Admi nistration, and most of the
administration’s officials appointed during Putin’s presidency remained
there. A similar policy was applied to the key institutions of force super-
vised by the president – Alexandr Bortnikov was appointed head of the
Federal Security Service, and Nikolai Patrushev secretary of the Security
Council. In the government, ministers who had been appointed during
Putin’s presidency (and who headed those ministries which are subordi-
nate to the president) retained their positions, including Foreign Mini -
10
4 Medvedev’s ‘liberal’ support was formed at the end of Vladimir Putin’s second presiden -
tial term, when the elite led by Putin were developing the succession strategy and consi -
der ing possible candidates for successors. Many politicians, businessmen and media
people – such as Reyman and Abramovich – who found themselves in Medvedev’s ‘pool’
were Putin's close associates.
ster Sergei Lavrov and the Ministry of the Interior Rashid Nurgaliev5.
Putin has weakened the new president’s control over the parliament,
assum ing formal leadership of the United Russia party (which dominates
the State Duma), and retained informal influence in the popular media6.
Finally, as Prime Minister, Putin took over direct management of the go -
vernment, and his extensive poli tical influence significantly weakened
President Medvedev’s constitutio nal control over the cabinet.
Both Russian and foreign observers (especially in the West) were perfec tly
aware of the conditions under which Dmitry Medvedev began his presi-
dency. The new president was perceived as a loyal member of Putin's
elite, and at the same time as an official with limited potential for inde-
pendent actions. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the core of the Russian
decision-making process was split, even if only formally, brought forth
a great deal of expectations that the new president would gradually ex -
pand the scope of his autonomy, which would entail reshuffles of person -
nel and possibly some change in Russia’s policies. The main arguments
quoted to support this point were the extensive powers of the Russian
president, and the likelihood that any person holding this office would
inevitably aspire to play a more significant role.
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5 For details, see Jadwiga Rogo˝a, ‘Vladimir Putin makes appointments to the govern-
ment and the Presidential Administration’, Eastweek, 14 May 2008.
6 One way in which Putin has retained influence in the media was through his close asso-
ciate banker Yuri Kovalchuk, who has become the most influential media mogul in recent
years, and now controls a number of TV channels (Ren-TV, NTV, Channel 5 and partly
Channel 1, the most popular TV station in Russia), newspapers (the Izvestia daily, the
Zhizn’ tabloid), popular Internet media (Life News holding) and Russia's largest advertis-
ing agency Video International which sells television advertising.
II. An adjustment to Russia’s image – 
from confrontation to cooperation 
A symbol of Medvedev's presidency was his modernising rhetoric, which
included appeals to build a modern state, and for the liberalisation and
modernisation of the economy through the use of new technologies. The
president’s rhetoric was often aimed at the existing economic model:
Medvedev criticised the excessive role of the state, the resource-orient-
ed model of the economy, and systemic corruption. However, his rhetoric
concerning the political sphere was far more conservative: Medvedev
only declared a gradual and cautious pursuit of democratisation, without
making ‘revolutionary’ changes or ‘importing democracy’ from abroad7.
This modernising rhetoric may indeed have been grounded in President
Medvedev’s personal beliefs. However, it is important that it was in line
with the interests of the entire ruling elite, which acknowledged the need
to adjust Russia’s image and some of its policies, and Dmitry Medvedev
became a credible representative of this adjustment. The need for ‘re -
branding’ was reinforced by the global economic crisis, which hit the
Rus sian economy hard and exposed the risk posed by its dependence on
the raw material markets.
In their search for new sources of income to supplement the existing ones
(mostly generated by the raw material sector), the Russian ruling elite
opted to attract investments and new technologies more dynamically;
and those could primarily be offered by the Western world. Therefore,
after years of a confrontational policy towards the West, Russia began to
demonstrate its desire to improve mutual relations8. The confrontational
anti-Western rhetoric was abandoned, along with the positioning of Russia
12
7 President Medvedev’s economic and political agenda was best presented in his liberal
manifesto ‘Forward Russia’ published on 10 September 2009 on the Gazeta.Ru website
(www.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/09/10_a_3258568.shtml).
8 For details, see Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old
wine in a new wineskin’, OSW Commentary, 1 September 2010.
as a self-sufficient ‘energy superpower’ which had been applied during
the economic boom. Instead, the Russian government began strength-
ening the country's image as a reliable partner for the West in the inter -
national arena (especially in security issues) and demonstrating an open-
ness to cooperation, including the limited admission of foreign investors
to strategic sectors of the Russian economy (such as the energy sector).
President Medvedev was the face of this new rhetoric, and his foreign vis-
its (such as when he visited Silicon Valley in 2010) were meant to attract
investors to Russia. The adjustment of the rhetoric and some of the poli-
cies resulted in a ‘new opening’ in international relations (the ‘reset’ in
Russian-US relations; the Partnership for Modernisation with the Euro -
pean Union; improving Russian-British relations; resolving territorial dis-
putes with Norway, etc.) as well as in intensifying cooperation with pri-
vate investors, mainly Western energy companies (such as Total, BASF,
ENI, and ExxonMobil), which have the technologies necessary to increase
the production of energy resources9. Several foreign investors have also
committed themselves to contribute to the planned innovation centre at
Skolkovo, which the government has presented as a Russian equivalent
of Silicon Valley.
A revision of official rhetoric could also be observed in domestic politics.
The new line was meant to illustrate that Russia was becoming a modern
state, seeking to democratise its political system. A reservation was made
that this evolution should be slow, gradual and resistant to ‘external inter -
ference’. In most cases, the change of rhetoric was merely a propaganda
trick, and was not accompanied by any real change in the government’s
policy towards the political opposition and the NGO sector. However, there
were areas wherein the state policy did undergo genuine evolution. One
example of this evolution is the de-Stalinisation of Russia’s historical po -
licy: the government decided to cease propagating vindications for Stalin
and his policy. Possibly, this approach was considered too controversial
13
9 For details, see Iwona WiÊniewska, ‘Controlled opening-up of Russia’s energy sector to fo -
reign investors’, Eastweek, 9 March 2011; Wojciech Konoƒczuk, ‘Rosneft's agreement with
ExxonMobil on cooperation in the Arctic’, Eastweek, 7 September 2011, www.osw.waw.pl.
(both abroad and in the Russian elites and society), while also being less
and less effective in mobilising public support within Russia. This change
was most actively personified by Medvedev, although Prime Minister Putin
also publicly supported it; both politicians publicly admitted that the
NKVD, under orders from the Stalinist authorities, had committed the
Katyn massacre.
By and large, the adjustment in domestic politics has come down to
a change in the atmosphere and tone of political discussions. This change
was initiated by Medvedev and stood in contrast to Putin's attitude during
his presidency, when groups which opposed the government were openly
harassed. Medvedev has loosened the restrictions of the public de bate
on political issues, allowed for criticism of the government, and ini tiated
a dialogue with groups that had been marginalised and ignored under
President Putin, such as the political opposition, human rights defend-
ers, and civil society activists involved in different protest movements.
The above-mentioned change in rhetoric, embodied by President
Medvedev, helped to improve the atmosphere in dialogue with foreign
partners and the Russian opposition and independent communities.
However, in terms of Russia’s real policies (both foreign and domestic),
it only brought about a very limited change. Moscow has not abandoned
its regional ambitions, especially in the area of the CIS, and it continues
to treat the US as its geopolitical rival. Russia’s invitation to cooperation
contains clear indications that this cooperation should be on Russia's
terms, and should be limited to business projects that would bring fi nan-
cial benefits to both parties. Moscow has stressed that this cooperation
cannot entail Western interference in Russia’s internal affairs or attempts
to reform its economic and political model. Similarly, the initiation of dia-
logue with the Russian opposition and independent communities was
used to neutralise their dissatisfaction with the government, and did not
lead to any real concessions to their demands10.
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10 This point is best illustrated by Medvedev's involvement in the dispute over the con-
struction of the Moscow-St Petersburg highway running through Khimki, a suburb of
III. Medvedev does what he’s told 
An assessment of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency leads to a conclusion
that his activity has served the interests of the ruling elite, primarily in
the economic sphere. His decisions have often contradicted his own rhe -
toric, especially his demands to fight corruption, get rid of political le -
ver age over the economy, and reduce the state's dominant role in the
public sphere. This contradiction has accompanied Medvedev through-
out his entire presidency: in his rhetoric he advocated a change of the
existing system of government, while in his actions he actually strength-
ened this system, or was merely a passive witness to this process.
Many of the political activities undertaken by Medvedev in fact served
the consolidation of the system of government formed by Vladimir Putin.
One of the most important measures he took was the extension of the
pre sident and parliament’s terms of office: the president’s term was ex -
tended from 4 to 6 years (the next and successive presidents will be able
to stay in power for 12 years), and the term of the State Duma deputies
was increased from 4 to 5 years. President Medvedev has also endorsed
the extension of the secret services’ powers to monitor the public (in -
clud ing the activities of the opposition and civil protest actions). The
crucial role of these services in controlling the political and social situa-
tion has been maintained during Medvedev’s presidency11.
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Moscow. Khimki residents and environmentalists had protested for several years against
the designated route of this highway, as it required felling a large part of the Khimki for-
est. After the protest escalated and the issue received a great deal of publicity (especial-
ly on the Internet), Medvedev ordered a halt to the construction of the highway and
organised public consultations on this matter. These decisions partially relieved the
social tension. However, several months later construction was resumed (with minimal
corrections to the initial plans), and the consortium that constructed the highway
(whose shareholder is Putin’s close associate Arkady Rotenberg) has appealed to the
state for extensive compensation for the downtime.
11 For details, see Piotr ˚ochowski, Prezydent Miedwiediew potwierdza rol´ resortów siło-
wych w zarzàdzaniu paƒstwem (available in Polish only), 8 February 2010, www.osw.
waw.pl.
The governance practice that developed in Putin’s presidency has also
been maintained during Medvedev's term. It is this practice, and not the
country’s constitutional legal framework, that is the key element of Rus -
sian reality. The main elements of this practice are the following: secre-
tiveness in making major decisions; strict control over the political and
economic sphere (the electoral process, economic decisions, acquisition
of assets); and the use of the parliament and the judiciary, which are for-
mally independent from the executive, in the interests of the elite. This
practice remains unchanged despite legislative amendments initiated by
the president, whose declared goal was the democratisation of political
and economic life. The scope of these amendments was very limited and
they were implemented inconsistently, which has reduced their effec-
tiveness to almost zero. The best illustration of this point is the electoral
process in Russia: despite President Medvedev's initiative to adopt a pack-
age of amendments designed to support smaller parties and gradually
eliminate controversial electoral procedures (such as the early voting),
the overall electoral practice has remained unchanged. During elections
at all levels, electoral tampering occurs in favour of United Russia, the
‘party of power’: the party is supported by federal and local authorities,
big business and important media, and favoured by the electoral com-
missions. Also, the Russian opposition, despite Medvedev’s invitation to
dialogue, is still persecuted in practice – opposition politicians are ha -
rass ed by the courts, the Prosecutor’s Office and the police, while state
institutions refuse to officially register opposition parties, which ex cludes
the latter from participating in elections12.
In the economic sphere, President Medvedev has had clearly limited room
for manoeuvre. PM Putin retained the real control over the economy, an
illustration of which has been the ongoing, spectacular economic expan-
sion of his close associates’ businesses. Putin's decisive role in the eco-
16
12 In June 2011, the Ministry of Justice refused to officially register the Parnas Party,
formed by the well-known opposition politicians Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Milov and
Vladimir Ryzhkov.
nomic sphere has been respected by foreign investors13. In this situation,
most of Medvedev’s economic agenda has been general and vague (the re-
duction of the state’s role in the economy, the fight against corruption),
and has not brought any tangible results. Moreover, even some of the spe -
cific economic demands and orders issued by Medvedev showed that his
formal powers did not correspond with his ability to implement them14.
Medvedev's presidential term was a period when Putin’s elite continu ed
its spectacular acquisition of assets and contracts on very attrac tive
terms. Among those whose businesses demonstrated the most remark-
able expansion in 2008-2011 were some of Vladimir Putin’s close asso-
ciates: the oil trader Gennady Timchenko15, the banker Yury Koval -
17
13 It was Vladimir Putin (rather than Medvedev) who was consulted on the investments of
foreign companies in Russia: Total of France (the agreement between Total and Novatek
was signed in March 2011 at Putin’s residence) and the US oil giant ExxonMobil’s coope -
ration with Rosneft (the agreement signed in August 2011 in Putin’s presence). Both of the
aforementioned Russian companies which partnered with foreign companies are controll -
ed by Putin's close associates (Novatek by Gennady Timchenko, and Rosneft by the de pu -
ty Prime Minister Igor Sechin).
14 The president's orders were often distorted by the manner of their implementation. One
example of this was the president’s order (March 2011) to remove members of the go -
vernment (except for the Prime Minister) from the boards of directors of state enterprises,
and to replace them with independent directors. As a result, the outgoing officials sought
to appoint their trusted associates to their positions, which would enable them to retain
con trol over the operation of these companies. Medvedev's demand to liquidate the state
corporations (goskorporatsii, the structures set up by Vladimir Putin at the end of his pre -
sidency, which control huge state assets while having considerable autonomy) was also
ignored. Only one of eight state corporations was transformed into a joint stock company,
three years after President Medvedev had voiced this demand.
15 In 2009, Gunvor, a company controlled by Timchenko took over assets in the oil trans-
portation sector (a 50% stake in a company constructing the Novorossiysk oil terminal),
the energy sector (acquisition of Stroytransgaz, the second largest company construct-
ing pipelines, including the BTS-2) and the gas sector (increasing the stake in the Novatek
gas company, the takeover of a large gas deposit on the Yamal peninsula), and several oil
deposits. Gunvor also took over several important foreign assets: in the oil trade sector
(the Castor Petroleum oil trader which supplies oil to the US) and insurance sector (the
German insurance company Sovag). In 2010, Novatek took over two gas companies in
succession (Severenergiya, Sibneftegaz), and obtained a licence to export the extracted
chuk16 and the Rotenberg brothers17 who operate in the gas and con-
struction industry. Medvedev remained a passive witness to this expan-
sion. Most of the described activities did not require the president’s for-
mal approval, as they were carried out under the appearances of market
principles (for example, the assets were sold in auctions). However, in
some cases Medvedev was forced to ‘countersign’ some economic deci-
sions, including those he publicly opposed (as an example, in 2008 he
signed a decree listing the assets of Rostekhnologii state corporation,
even though Medvedev himself had appealed for the liquidation of state
corporations, and had tense relations with Rostekhnologii head Sergei
Chemezov).
18
LNG and the right to participate in the distribution of profits from LNG with Gazprom.
In June 2011, Novatek was granted exemption from taxation on gas extraction in the
Yamal deposit, while Gunvor completed the construction of an oil-product terminal in
Ust-Luga. For details, see Wojciech Konoƒczuk, ‘Making money on the crisis in Russia: the
case of Gennady Timchenko’, OSW Commentary, 28 December 2009.
16 In 2010, Kovalchuk’s company was granted a federal license to construct the Moscow-
-Minsk highway. Through the Leader management company, Kovalchuk took control over
Gazprombank, which allowed him to increase his leverage in the banking sector (in 2010
he carried out a merger with Gazenergoprombank) and in the media sphere
(Gazprombank controls many popular media assets, including NTV channel and Ekho
Moskvy radio, for details see footnote 6).
17 In 2010, Stroygazmontazh, a company controlled by the Rotenbergs, procured a $3.5 bil -
lion contract to construct the Gryazovets-Vyborg gas pipeline on Gazprom’s order, and
in 2011 the company became the general contractor for the construction of the Nord Stream
pipeline. In March 2011 Stroygazmontazh took over Gazprom's subsidiary Gazprom -
Burenie (according to experts, at a price several times lower than its market value). The
Northwest Concession Company, owned by Arkady Rotenberg. is constructing the first
section of the Moscow-St Petersburg highway in partnership with the French company
Vinci. The Mostotrest company, owned by the Rotenberg brothers, procured contracts for
building Olympic facilities in Sochi and sports facility in St Petersburg worth $100 mil-
lion. Companies controlled by the Rotenbergs are also continuing to expand in the liquor
industry.
IV. The middle class: 
great expectations gone awry 
The change in the President’s rhetoric, his consent to political discussions,
and especially his appeals to modernise the country and reduce the ex -
cessive role of the state, raised – especially at the beginning of Medvedev's
presidency – great expectations of changes in those groups in Russian
society whose interests conflicted with the system devised by Putin.
Over the past ten years, a group has evolved within Russian society that
owes its successes (material and other) to the country’s economic devel-
opment, as well as its own initiative and entrepreneurship. This group
can be conventionally termed the middle class18, and it includes people
running small and medium-sized businesses, intellectuals (including re -
presentatives of the academic world, the media and arts), various types
of professionals and managers, and even some officials, especially of the
younger generation. To some extent, many Russians of the younger and
middle generations who aspire to join the middle class can also be rank -
ed with this group. This groups is far from being compact or homogeneous,
but its members are united in their aspirations to reduce the state’s do mi-
nation in the public sphere (including the economy), to increase social
control over the government (including the reduction of systemic corrup-
tion as well as the lawlessness and impunity of state bodies), and to re -
duce the numerous bureaucratic and administrative barriers that ham-
per public entrepreneurship and opportunities for promotion. The middle
class is much less focused on demands for political changes, although its
members increasingly often admit that their demands cannot be met
without systemic reforms. Representatives of this group stress that the
19
18 Depending on the criteria adopted, experts estimate the size of the middle class as
anywhere between 7 million people, i.e. 5% of the population (Tatiana Maleva, director
of the Independent Institute of Social Policy, Evgeny Gontmakher, expert of the INSOR
think tank) to 28 million people, i.e. 20% of the population (Institute of Sociology of the
Russian Academy of Sciences).
current system of governance does not promote initiative and entrepre-
neurship, but rather sees any active attitude as a threat to the decision
makers. The middle class are convinced that the beneficiaries of the cur-
rent model of the state include, on the one hand, the ruling elite and the
affiliated groups, and on the other, the multitude of poor and passive citi -
zens, who see material support from the state budget as the only chance
to improve their lives19.
Medvedev's presidency saw the activation of the aforementioned groups
and the public expression of their demands. One of the things that prov -
ed extremely conducive to this process was the Internet: for people who
consider themselves middle class, the web is the most important source
of information, communication and coordination of their activities20 (in
today’s Russia, over 40 million people have daily access to the Internet).
An important role in voicing the middle class’s expectations was played
by prominent representatives of the intellectual elites, including experts
associated with Medvedev (primarily the INSOR think tank and its head
Igor Yurgens). These expectations come down to demands for a new ‘so -
cial contract’ with the government, as the previous ‘social contract’ form-
ed under Vladimir Putin's presidency (stability and improvement of living
standards after the chaos and economic problems of the 1990s, in ex -
change for public support for the government’s policy) has been wear-
ing thin. Now, in a situation of relative political and economic stability,
20
19 For details, see Lev Gudkov (director of the polling agency Levada Centre), ‘Novogodniy
balans: bez budushchego’, Vedomosti, 12 January 2011; Dmitry Oreshkin, ‘Beg. Pochzemu
uyezzhayut iz Rossii?’, Novaya Gazeta, 30 January 2011.
20 The most interesting example of this is the activity of the well-known lawyer and blog-
ger Alexei Navalny, who has for several years now investigated and publicised cases of
corruption in state-owned companies. In early 2011 Navalny created the Rospil.info web-
site, which is exclusively devoted to anti-corruption activity: he has employed lawyers
to investigate state tenders which are suspected of corruption. The website is support-
ed by internet users who send information on alleged cases of corruption. This activity
is financed exclusively from contributions raised from Internet users. According to
Rospil.info, Navalny and his colleagues have so far managed to stop embezzlement
amounting to $255 million.
the middle class is seeking to renegotiate these terms: to make the sys-
tem of government more flexible (including the creation of political repre -
sentation for the middle class, independent of the government), to broad-
en the extent of individual freedoms for the active groups, to increase
the possibilities for social mobility and allow them to act independently
of the government, to strengthen free market institutions (free competi-
tion, protection of private property) and the independent judiciary.
Despite Medvedev's engagement in the dialogue with the representati -
ves of the middle class and his repeated demands to modernise Russia,
his activity has been increasingly critically judged as his presidency has
proceeded. In the opinion of the middle class, the president’s declara-
tions have not produced any tangible results, and the gap between his
modernisation rhetoric and undemocratic practice is deepening. Over time,
Medvedev has been increasingly perceived as a politician who lacks au -
to nomy and is unable to oppose Putin's elite, which is unwilling to make
any concessions to the middle class. Even though the development of this
group would stimulate Russia’s long-term economic development21, it col -
lides with the actual (and undeclared) priorities of the ruling elite. Should
the middle class develop more dynamically, many new groups un related
to the government would appear in Russia and try to defend their inter-
ests, for example by seeking to create independent political representa-
tion. In the mid-term perspective, this could lead to the emergence of an
economic and political alternative to the current ruling camp.
Meanwhile, the ‘white collar’ workers’ growing disillusionment with
Medvedev has exacerbated negative social and economic trends such as
capital flight (after a wave of big oligarchic capital leaving Russia, we are
21
21 Tatiana Maleva, director of the Independent Institute for Social Policy, ‘Umnye i bo -
gatye’, Novaya Gazeta, 31 January 2011: ‘The middle class and its closest social environ-
ment can take on the solution of many economic problems. To be able to do this, they do
not need financial transfers, they need institutions. This will require certain expendi-
tures, but they should not be seen as a financial burden but as social investments, and
if used rationally, they will boost Russia’s efficiency and productivity.’
now witnessing the flight of medium-sized capital22), emigration to the
West (most of the emigrants are active citizens who are disappointed
with the lack of prospects in today's Russia – especially younger, well-
educated people, coming from big cities and often running their own
businesses23). Pessimism and concerns about the prospects for Russia’s
development are growing, which is most evident in Moscow and other
big cities24. They are accompanied by ferment among intellectual elites
and an ever more open criticism of the Russian system of government
during Medvedev’s presidency, which is seen as a continuation of Putin’s
system. Even those experts who cooperate with the government stress
the need for changes. A report released in March 2011 by the Centre for
Strategic Research (a think tank advising PM Putin) warned the govern-
ment against the loss of its legitimacy and the risk of a political crisis if
current policies are continued, especially if the electoral process is tam-
pered with25.
22
22 The Central Bank of Russia reports that capital of a total value of $38.3 billion escaped
from Russia in 2010 (one and a half times more than the Bank had forecast). The reasons
for this increase are the worsening investment climate, deeply rooted corruption and
uncertainty as to the prospects for economic development. These negative trends were
exacerbated by Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s second trial. The renowned Russian economist
Vladimir Mau has pointed out that the current capital flight is not caused by oligarchs
transferring money abroad, but by people with average incomes who are ‘exporting’
their medium-sized savings. For details, see Anastasia Bashkatova, ‘Kapitalnyi otskok na
Zapad’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 January 2011.
23 According to the Accounts Chamber, 1,250,000 people have left Russia in recent years
(for details see www.nr2.ru/moskow/318989.html). Sociologists point out that this wave
of emigration is dominated by representatives of the middle class, disappointed by the
gloomy prospects (See Dmitry Oreshkin, op.cit.). Vladimir Mau points out that the emi-
gration of the intellectual and business elites to the West is one of the greatest challen -
ges to Russia’s further development (‘Proshlyi god - god nervicheskogo uspokoyeniya’,
Vedomosti, 20 January 2011).
24 58% of Russian citizens declare that they do not feel protected by the law (in Moscow
this number rises to 73%). See Lev Gudkov, op.cit.
25 Krizis na porogye, a report by the Centre for Strategic Research, www.csr.ru, 28 March
2011.
V. Medvedev's presidency: 
a missed opportunity to gain independence 
While holding the office of President, Dmitry Medvedev has not overcome
the restrictions imposed on him at the start of his presidential term by
his predecessor, and has not significantly expanded the scope of his au -
to nomy. Medvedev has not created a consolidated support base for him-
self; nor has he gained influence on economic issues such as the distrib-
ution of assets. Finally, Medvedev has failed to initiate any major chan -
ges in Russia's domestic policy that would be in line with his declara-
tions of modernisation.
As president, Medvedev had some margin of freedom within the unwrit-
ten ‘division of labour’ between him and Prime Minister Putin. The Pre -
sident’s sphere of responsibility was Russia's foreign policy; Medvedev
represented the state in its relations with foreign partners, conducted ne -
gotiations and signed international agreements, including the new START
treaty with the U.S. on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. At the
same time, the main directions of his activity were in line with the inter-
ests of the entire ruling elite (such as Russia’s ‘new opening’ to the West),
which may suggest that they had been discussed and consulted within
the elite. In the case of ‘non-standard’ decisions, discrepant from the go -
vernment’s previous stance or going against the interests of the elite (such
as Russia’s stance on Libya26), the President’s activity and statements
provoked disputes and polemics, including with Vladimir Putin.
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26 Several large Russian companies associated with the ruling elite had business in Libya,
including Gazprom, Russian Railways and arms industry companies. During the vote on
the UN Security Council resolution on Libya in March 2011, which sanctioned the use of
force against that country, Russia abstained from voting, thus allowing the resolution to
be adopted. This was an untypical action, given that Moscow had previously vetoed sim-
ilar projects. This resolution was publicly criticised by PM Putin (and several other
Russian politicians), and Medvedev in turn deemed Putin’s words ‘unacceptable’.
As head of state, Medvedev was formally entitled to make key state deci-
sions. However, the nature of his decisions within these fields (i.e. their
con currence with the interests of the ruling elite) suggest that many of
them had been consulted with other members of the elite. One illustration
of this point may be the process of replacing the regional governors, which
has accelerated under President Medvedev. In the case of the most im -
portant Russian governor – the mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, who had
ruled Moscow for almost 20 years – Medvedev dismissed him, but was un-
able to appoint his ‘own man’ to this position; the newly appointed ma yor
is in fact a close associate of Putin, Sergei Sobyanin. During Medvedev's
presidency, minor reshuffles occurred in the ruling elite (a few of its members
have been marginalised, such as Viktor Cherkesov and Ser gei Pugachev27).
But these did not result from Medvedev’s actions, and were rather a ref -
lection of personal and financial conflicts within Vladimir Putin’s en -
tourage.
Many of Medvedev's formal presidential powers have remained on paper
only. The President has never exercised his right to make staff reshuffles
in the government, though he has repeatedly suggested that he was very
critical of individual ministers28. Medvedev has almost never used his
right of veto29. During his presidency, the practice of organising weekly
cabinet meetings chaired by the President was abandoned (this practice
24
27 Cherkesov fell into disgrace after he described the internal conflicts in the secret ser-
vices in a newspaper article in the autumn of 2007, provoking Vladimir Putin’s public
displeasure. In the case of Pugachev (a banker and owner of shipyards), his companies
experienced economic problems, and the lack of help from the state financial structures
(including the Central Bank) should be treated as an expression of Vladimir Putin's will,
as the Prime Minister is in control of Russia’s financial sector.
28 The only minister who left the government was the minister of agriculture Alexei
Gordeyev, whom the President appointed governor of the Voronezh oblast; however this
cannot be treated as a case of a dismissal of a minister criticised by Medvedev.
29 An exception was Medvedev’s veto (in November 2010) of the parliament’s amend-
ments to the Law on Assembly, which imposed significant restrictions on the organisers
of demonstrations and rallies. However, the law was soon re-voted and passed in an
almost unchanged form, and signed by Medvedev.
was introduced during Putin’s presidency; Putin often used these meet-
ings to publicly blame the prime minister and individual ministers for
economic and social problems). In addition, many formal orders by Pre -
sident Medvedev were garbled or not implemented at all (see footnote
14), which provoked him to public outbursts of frustration. Moreover,
Medvedev has failed to create his own personnel resource base. His
op portunities to fill important state positions with ‘his people’ were
extremely limited: he has only succeeded in appointing a few of his asso-
ciates to minor positions in the Presidential Administration30. Especially
at the beginning of his presidential term, Medvedev’s supporters were
joined by liberal economists, businessmen, media people, experts and hu -
man rights defenders (for details see ‘Medvedev’s entourage’). However,
they never became a consolidated team; Medvedev’s supporters were
rather a loose group of individuals attracted by the president’s mod-
ernisation-oriented declarations, while their personal views were often
much more liberal than those of Medvedev himself. Most of them had
very limited leverage on the situation in Russia, and their declarations
of support for the president were often accompanied by high expecta-
tions, including of change in the ruling camp’s policies.
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30 ‘Medvedev’s people’ in the Presidential Administration included Konstantin Chu y -
chenko, who was appointed head of the Control Directorate (Chuychenko had previously
worked in Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo), the presidential aide Arkady Dvorkovich (during
Putin’s presidency Dvorkovich was deputy minister of economic development and head
of the Expert Group in the Presidential Administration), the president’s press secretary
Natalya Timakova (during Putin’s presidency she was head of his press service office) and
Sergei Dubik, the head of the Presidential Directorate for Civil Service and Personnel
Board (appointed in 2001). It should be stressed, however, that all the aforementioned
politicians began working in the state administration under President Putin (2000-2008).
‘Medvedev’s entourage’
Konstantin Chuychenko – head of the Control Directorate 
of the Presidential Administration (PA)
Arkady Dvorkovich – presidential aide (PA)
Natalya Timakova – president’s press secretary (PA)
Sergei Dubik – head of the Directorate for Civil Service 
and the Personnel Board (PA)
Anton Ivanov – chairman of the Supreme Court of Arbitration
Sergei Mavrin – vice-president of the Constitutional Court
Alexandr Konovalov – minister of justice
Nikolai Vinnichenko – presidential envoy 
to the North-Western Federal District
Igor Yurgens – head of INSOR think tank 
(Institute of Contemporary Development)
Gleb Pavlovsky – political scientist, electoral adviser, 
head of the Foundation for Effective Policy
Alexandr Voloshin – former head of the Presidential
Administration, currently overseeing the establishment 
of an international financial centre in Moscow
Anatoly Chubais – head of the Rosnano company
Tatyana Dyachenko, Valentin Yumashev – 
members of Boris Yeltsin’s ‘Family’ group, 
who enjoyed great political influence in the 1990s
Konstantin Remchukov, editor-in-chief of the Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta daily
Businessmen who have supported Medvedev:
Roman Abramovich, Alexandr Lebedev, Alisher Usmanov,
Suleyman Kerimov
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Medvedev has failed to create or promote a political party which could
have acted as his personnel and electoral support base. Moreover, since
the spring of 2011, several people from his entourage who publicly ex -
pressed their support for Medvedev’s candidacy in the upcoming presi-
dential election (as an alternative to Vladimir Putin’s candidacy) have
been subjected to harassment31. The lack of Medvedev’s political autono -
my has been increasingly highlighted in public debate; many of his pre-
vious supporters have expressed disappointment with the president, as
he has been closely monitored and controlled by Putin’s elite32.
Medvedev’s rhetoric of modernisation, which was often critical of do mes-
tic affairs (including Russia’s system of government and economic mo -
del) cannot be equated with his emancipation from Putin’s control, nor
with any conflict between himself and Vladimir Putin, who created this
system. What seems likely is that Medvedev’s ‘liberal narrative’ was per-
mitted by other members of the ruling elite, including Putin himself.
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31 The presidential electoral adviser Gleb Pavlovsky, who explicitly appealed for Medvedev’s
re-election and criticised Vladimir Putin, was dismissed from his position of adviser to
the president, and his Foundation for Effective Policy, which had existed since 1995 and
provided electoral support for the government, was forced to close. The banker Alexandr
Lebedev was forced to sell most of his assets under the pressure from the Federal Secu rity
Service. The former chairman of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov, who also support-
ed Medvedev, lost his position and also had to step down as the leader of the Just Russia
party, which was being harassed by the government.
32 In 2011, in an open letter published in the Vedomosti daily (27 July 2011) entitled ‘The
president must make up his mind’, Igor Yurgens and Evgeny Gontmakher expressed their
dissatisfaction with the lack of results of many Medvedev’s declarations. They also criti -
cised Medvedev and Putin's repeated declarations that ‘when the time is right’, they will
decide together which one of them would run in the next presidential election. Gleb
Pavlovsky, who favoured Medvedev’s re-election, concluded that Medvedev ‘is a nobody’:
he lacks his own support base and refrains from conducting his own electoral campaign,
driven by loyalty towards Putin (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 May 2011). The former president
of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, who also openly supported Medvedev, admitted that the
incumbent president is ‘erudite, a good lawyer, but he lacks grit, we can see his weak-
ness, Putin does not allow him to expand’ (interview for Ekho Moskvy, 23 July 2011).
Back in 2007, when Medvedev was still a candidate participating in the
election campaign, his liberal and modernising rhetoric were made a key
element of his image, which was sanctioned by Putin and his entourage.
Moreover, most of Medvedev's declarations remained on paper, and were
not identified with his own desires or the possibility of implementing
them. It is also worth noting that Medvedev’s rhetoric has not been con-
sistent throughout recent years, resulting from his dependence on the
cur rent interests of the Russian elite. Even though his rhetoric on foreign
affairs and security issues had a more cooperative tone (compared to Vla -
dimir Putin’s declarations), during the Russian-Georgian war Medvedev
acted as a ‘hawk’ and used aggressive anti-Western language.
Despite his extensive constitutional powers, Medvedev has remained
the weaker link of the ‘asymmetric tandem’ throughout his entire presi-
dency, which once again shows the scale of Russia’s institutional weak-
ness and the impact of informal mechanisms. Informal relations and ar -
rangements within Putin's entourage proved much more important than
constitutional provisions and legal framework. Due to this, members of
Putin’s elite with modest formal powers and sometimes no public func-
tions at all (such as Gennady Timchenko, Yuri Kovalchuk, and the Roten -
berg brothers) enjoyed spectacular financial expansion and remarkable
effectiveness in lobbying legal changes that benefited them. Despite hold -
ing the key office of state, Dmitry Medvedev never became a genuine,
full-fledged decision maker in major political and economic matters.
Vladimir Putin has retained the position of the ruling elite’s leader, and
has repeatedly demonstrated that it is he who will take the decisions
concerning the forthcoming presidential elections.
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VI. What will be left after Medvedev? 
What will Putin bring? 
Vladimir Putin is the ruling elite’s candidate in the upcoming presiden-
tial elections in March 2012. He also remains the leader of this elite and
the one who holds it together. Putin has conducted an intensive public
campaign since spring 2011, and has presented himself as an ‘iron-hand -
ed’ politician, who at the same time is concerned with society’s needs
and comprehends the modernisation challenges facing Russia. Since
Medvedev's presidency will be limited to one term, the question is whe -
ther any of the actions he has taken in the last four years will bring sus-
tainable effects; and on the other hand, what will the consequences be
of Vladimir Putin's return to the most important office in Russia.
Medvedev's presidency differed from his predecessor’s policies not so much
in essence (Medvedev’s policies were largely a continuation of Putin’s, and
were in line with the interests of the same ruling elite), as in form and style.
Medvedev’s trademark was his more conciliatory attitude (in foreign and
do mestic affairs) and his modernisation-oriented rhetoric, stressing Rus -
sia's determination to become a modern state. This rhetoric is likely to be
employed further by the Russian government, to support its efforts to
attract Western investments and new technologies, and to strengthen
Russia’s economic cooperation with the West, especially in the light of the
possible next wave of the economic crisis and recession in the coming years.
A measurable and enduring ‘legacy’ of Medvedev's presidency – albeit
one possibly unintended by the president himself – may be the process
of ‘activating’ Russian society (see Chapter IV), which accelerated thanks
to the modernisation rhetoric used by Medvedev, and discussions about
the need for the changes he has initiated and given his consent to. How -
ever, the activist groups have been disappointed with the results of Med -
vedev's presidency. Recent years have seen an increase in the number of
voters who claim they have no political representation, who support nei-
ther Putin nor Medvedev, nor any official political party participating in
the coming parliamentary elections. These groups’ demand for the ex -
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change of elites will increase. The ferment in these groups has been fur-
ther fuelled by the government’s electoral strategy in the upcoming par-
liamentary and presidential elections: the pursuit of full control over the
electoral process, and the elite’s inability to carry out a more flexible poli -
cy that would take into account the diverse political sympathies of the
Russian public, and would permit at least partial autonomy for the politi -
cal parties which participate in the election. The mechanisms of political
competition in Russia remain blocked, which makes the chances of any offi-
cial political rivals to the ruling camp emerging over the next few years
rather minute. However, in the longer term, the discontent of the middle
class and business elites with the government’s policy is likely to rise, and
the interests of the narrow ruling elite and other players may come into
increasing conflict. The government’s determination to maintain full con-
trol over the official political scene may also increase the risk of strength -
ening of those groups that now remain outside the official circuit, such as
the nationalist groups which have been gaining popularity in recent years.
The return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency is not encountering any
serious obstacles, either in Russia or abroad. Public support for Putin is
high (he remains Russia’s most popular politician), while the ‘discon-
tented’ groups have as yet limited social potential. Russia’s foreign part-
ners, including investors, also perceive Putin as the leader and guaran-
tor of Russia’s internal stability, which translates into the stability of co-
operation with Russian business partners (most of whom are Putin’s
associates). Putin’s return is being accompanied by a wide-ranging pro-
paganda campaign, depicting him as a modern and modernisation-ori-
ented politician who is determined to take the necessary measures of re -
form. Upon his return, Putin may indeed carry out some limited econo -
mic reforms, as he did at the beginning of his first presidency in 2000.
This image may also be exploited externally; the Kremlin is likely to seek
further cooperation with foreign partners, also through economic part-
nerships with Western investors, who may become lobbyists for Russia's
good relations with the West. At the same time, the new-old president is
likely to continue the domestic policy he conducted in 2000-2008, and
seek to control the domestic political sphere.
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Despite this seeming stability, Putin's presidency may face several major
challenges in the next few years. First, a second wave of economic crisis
and a decline in energy resource prices is projected in the near future. This
would be a serious challenge for the Russian economy, which survived the
first wave of the crisis (2008-2009) largely due to the financial reserves
which it had previously accumulated. Another wave of the crisis – and even
more so, a significant and continuing decline in energy resource prices –
might hit Russia hard (its financial reserves are now substantially reduced)
and force it to confront the need to undertake unpopular reforms of public
finances, such as cuts in social expenditures or the arms industry’s budget.
Activities like these may bring negative political consequences – exacer-
bate social discontent, undermine the go vernment’s popularity, and gener-
ate conflicts for resources among the mem bers of the ruling elite.
Another challenge to Putin’s presidency may be the weakening of the rul -
ing elite’s legitimacy. Electoral fraud has become much more evident over
recent years, as has been regularly highlighted by independent activists
and the media, primarily the Internet (almost 1/3 of Russians use the In -
ternet daily). Awareness of electoral manipulation is already widespread33,
and fuels discontent in the politically active part of the Russian public,
while the so-called negative electorate (those who will not vote for any
of the officially registered candidates or parties) is growing ever larger.
The government’s weakened legitimacy may become an additional fac-
tor undermining its position if Russia’s economic difficulties exacerbate.
However, it is now difficult to predict who could take advantage of any
such possible weakness: could it be the modernisation-oriented middle
class, or the populist and nationalist groups who are gaining momen-
tum, and whose activity is also directed against the government?
Jadwiga Rogo˝a
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33 According to the survey conducted by the Levada Centre on 28 July 2011, 53% of
respondents expressed their conviction that the coming parliamentary elections would
be merely an imitation of an election, and that the seats in the Duma would be distrib-
uted in accordance with the government’s decisions.
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